Scholarship Repository
University of Minnesota Law School
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2009

Differential Compensation and the "Race to the Bottom" in
Consumer Insurance Markets
Daniel Schwarcz
University of Minnesota Law School, schwarcz@umn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel Schwarcz, Differential Compensation and the "Race to the Bottom" in Consumer Insurance
Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 723 (2009), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/567.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION AND THE
“RACE TO THE BOTTOM” IN
CONSUMER INSURANCE MARKETS
Daniel Schwarcz*
***
This contribution to a symposium on insurance intermediaries analyzes
insurers’ compensation of independent agents and brokers in consumer
markets. It focuses on various forms of “differential compensation,”
whereby an intermediary’s compensation differs depending on the insurer
with which the consumer ultimately purchases coverage. Such differential
compensation, the article argues, undermines competition among consumer
insurers with respect to non-price product attributes. This, in turn,
increases the risk of a “race to the bottom” in consumer insurance
markets, as insurers focus on selling the cheapest coverage possible that is
consistent with legal restrictions. To address these problems, this article
suggests that insurers who rely on independent agents to sell consumer
lines of insurance should be prohibited from paying different rates of
compensation to different agents for the sale of the same line of insurance.
***
In 2004, a series of lawsuits filed by the New York Attorney
General challenged insurers’ long-standing payments of year-end bonuses
to insurance brokers. The lawsuits alleged that these payments, known as
contingent commissions, created conflicts of interest that undermined
*

Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. For helpful
comments, I thank Hazel Beh, Tom Cotter, Sean Fitzpatrick, Kristin Hickman,
Claire Hill, Brett McDonnell, Francesco Parisi, Jeffrey Stempel, an anonymous
referee, attendees of the Insurance Intermediaries panel at the 2008 Annual
Association of Law Schools, and participants in a research seminar at the
Department of Risk Management and Insurance at Georgia State University. This
symposium piece builds off of my earlier article, Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond
Disclosure: The Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 289 (2007).
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brokers’ professed loyalty to their clients.1 “If the practices identified in
our suit are as widespread as they appear to be,” the Attorney General
stated, “then the industry’s fundamental business model needs major
corrective action and reform.”2
Within months of these allegations, the commercial insurance
industry had indeed changed significantly. Each of the four largest
insurance brokers pledged to end their practice of accepting contingent
commission payments from insurers.3 Because of the concentration of the
insurance brokerage industry – the three largest brokers, Marsh, Aon, and
Willis enjoyed more than a 54% market share among the top 100 brokers in
20044 – this shift dramatically impacted the entire market. Meanwhile, the
prominence of these allegations led corporate risk managers and other
sophisticated insurance purchasers to demand from their brokers
previously-undisclosed details about contingent commission arrangements.5
Although many small brokers still accept contingent commissions, many
other brokers (including the four largest) now publicly tout their refusal to
accept such commissions in marketing themselves to their clients.6

1

See generally Sean M. Fitzpatrick, The Small Laws: Eliot Spitzer and the
Way to Insurance Market Reform, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3047 (2006)
(reviewing the trajectory of Attorney General Spitzer’s investigation of contingent
commissions); Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The Case for Banning
Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289 (2007).
2

Press Release, Eliot Spitzer, New York Attorney Gen., Investigation Reveals
Widespread Corruption in Insurance Industry (Oct. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/oct/oct14a_04.html.
3

See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 291-92.

4

See J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of Insurance
Intermediaries, 73 J. RISK & INS. 359, 364 (2006).
5

See David Dwanka, Mid-Level Insurance Brokers Defend Contingent
Commissions Amid Growing Criticism, BESTWIRE, May 8, 2006.
6

Broker Compensation: Hearing Before the New York Ins. Comm’r (2008)
(testimony of Don Bailey, CEO of Willis) (testifying that Willis does not accept
contingent commissions because they pose a "clear and obvious conflict of
interest") available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/agbrok/br_cmp_indx.htm.
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For all of this reform in commercial insurance markets, virtually
nothing has changed about the way intermediaries in consumer insurance
markets are compensated. In both property/casualty and life/health
consumer insurance lines, most independent insurance agents continue to
receive increased compensation from insurers to whom they steer a
significant amount of business.7 And, unlike sophisticated insurance
purchasers, most consumers continue to have no real understanding of these
practices and the impact they may have on the advice that insurance agents
offer.
From a doctrinal perspective, this divergence in consumer and
commercial insurance markets may appear to be perfectly reasonable. The
insurance brokers that service commercial insurance markets are generally
considered to be legal agents of policyholders.8 By contrast, the
independent insurance agents that populate consumer insurance markets are
usually described primarily as legal agents of insurers, rather than
consumers, and therefore have more limited (if any) fiduciary obligations to
policyholders.9 Consequently, compensation structures that create conflicts
of interest appear to be more troubling doctrinally in commercial markets
than in consumer markets.
But from an economic perspective, the differential reform in
commercial and consumer insurance markets is bizarre.
Unlike
sophisticated commercial entities, ordinary consumers generally have
limited information about the relative quality of different carriers and a
bounded ability to translate the information they do have into effective
As Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler recently
decision-making.10
observed, “the benefits from holding . . . insurance are delayed, the
7

See generally id.; see also Richard W. Cooper, Spitzer’s Allegations of the
Anticompetitive Effects of Contingent Commissions: A Shot Truly Heard Around
the World, J. OF INS. REG. 83, 100 (2007).
8

See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 56-57 (3d ed.
2000).
9

ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES’ APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D: LAW OF
INSURANCE AGENTS § 47.5, at 326 (1998). See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND
POLICY 66 (2003); Colin Sammon, Comment, Insurance Agent and Broker
Liability: Crossing the Two Way Street, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 237, 238 (2002).
10

See Part II, infra.
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probability of having a claim is hard to analyze, consumers do not get
useful feedback about whether they are getting a good return on their
insurance purchases, and mapping from what they are buying to what they
are getting can be ambiguous.”11 Consumers are therefore much more
susceptible than commercial purchasers to being steered to insurance
carriers they would not prefer under ideal market conditions.
Not only does such steering create mismatches between consumers
and their insurers, but it undermines the competitiveness of consumer
insurance markets as a whole. Although consumer insurance markets are
ultra-competitive with respect to price,12 they are remarkably noncompetitive with respect to claims handling quality.13 Indeed, many
consumer insurance markets appear to be characterized by insurer-side
adverse selection, wherein price competition creates a race to the bottom
among insurers with respect to claims handling quality.14 This Article
argues that differential compensation contributes to this insurer-side
adverse selection. By corrupting the objectivity of independent agents’
advice, differential compensation undermines the primary mechanism by
which consumers can ordinarily overcome informational and cognitive
limitations in assessing the quality of complicated financial products.
As such, this Article proposes that insurers who rely on
independent agents to sell consumer lines of insurance should be prohibited
from paying different rates of compensation to different agents for the sale
of the same line of insurance. Such reform would be less radical than it
may initially appear. Federal regulators have long regulated commissions
11

CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE 76-77 (2008).

12

See J. DAVID CUMMINS, DEREGULATING PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE
2-3 (2002); Paul Joskow, Cartels, Competition, and Regulation in the PropertyLiability Insurance Industry, RAND J. ECON. 375 (1973).
13
14

See Section II. B., infra.

Legal scholarship has long recognized that such price competition can cause
firms to provide inefficiently poor quality when consumers cannot reliably evaluate
quality due to information deficits or systematic cognitive limitations. See
generally Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction By Plastic, 98 NW. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2004);
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas
A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999).
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for the sale of Medigap policies, and they recently announced their
intention to do the same for Medicare Advantage programs.15 By extending
these policies to the sale of all consumer insurance policies, lawmakers
could provide consumers with the same protections that sophisticated
commercial entities already enjoy. Even more importantly, they could
enhance the competitiveness of consumer insurance markets as a whole.
I.

INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS AND DIFFERENTIAL
COMPENSATION
A. INSURANCE AGENTS IN CONSUMER INSURANCE MARKETS

Consumers can purchase insurance coverage directly from an
insurer, or through either independent or captive agents. Captive agents are
employees of a single insurer and only offer coverage with that carrier.16
By contrast, independent agents can write business with multiple insurers
and consequently provide consumers with a choice of carriers.17 Such
choice can be valuable for consumers, as insurers differ in terms of their
reputations for claims handling, financial strength, risk management
services, and scope of coverage offered.18 In addition to these variations in
15

See generally Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (limiting agent compensation so that first year
compensation may not be greater than twice renewal compensation, renewal
compensation must be paid for at least 5 years, and replacement commissions may
not be greater than renewal commissions for the product); Press Release, Center for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, CMS Proposes New Protections for Medicare
Beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage and prescription Programs (May 8, 2008)
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ (describing proposed regulation that would
“require Medicare Advantage organizations to establish commission structures for
sales agents and brokers that are level across all years and across all [Medicare
Advantage] plan product types”).
16
17
18

HOLMES, supra note 9, at 326.
Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 375.

See id.; Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 296-97. Independent
insurance agents market themselves primarily on the basis of their capacity to help
consumers compare these variations in quality and pricing. As the website of their
main trade organization explains, independent agents “work with you to identify
the insurance . . . that [is] right for you… and use [their] access to multiple
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“quality,” insurers employ differing underwriting criteria and strategies,
resulting in price differentials even in highly price competitive
marketplaces.19
Consumers may prefer independent agents over captive agents for
other reasons as well. First, many insurers do not offer insurance directly
to consumers or distribute their products through captive agents, meaning
consumers who want to purchase policies from these insurers must go
through an independent agent.20 Second, because independent agents
“own” their customer lists, insurers cannot directly solicit the agent’s
clients or switch those clients to a different agent. Some have argued that
this ownership gives independent agents a comparatively strong incentive
to serve their clients, though empirical efforts have failed to confirm this
theory.21
Of course, there are offsetting costs associated with purchasing
coverage through an independent rather than captive agent. First, just as
some insurers only provide coverage through independent agents, many
popular insurers, such as State Farm and Allstate, only offer coverage
through captive agents.22 In general, these insurers tend to be more
companies to deliver those products.” Independent Insurance Agents & Brokers of
America – Consumer Information, http://www.iiaa.org. A brochure designed by the
National Association of Professional Insurance Agents similarly explains that “by
shopping among various companies, your professional agent can find the best
combination of coverage, price and service -- the best value for your insurance
dollar.” National Association of Professional Insurance Agents, Straight Talk
about
Choosing
a
Professional
Insurance
Agent,
http://www.pianet.com/Publications/ choosinganagentbrochure.htm.
19

See, e.g., Meg Green, Top of Their Game, BEST’S REVIEW 26 (Dec. 2006)
(describing how some of the most profitable property-casualty insurers focus on
underwriting only particularly safe risks, and pass off some of the resulting cost
savings to their insureds).
20

See Laureen Regan & Sharon Tennyson, Agent Discretion and the Choice of
Insurance Marketing System, 39 J. L. & ECON. 637, 639 (1996).
21

Helen Doerpinghaus, An Analysis of Complaint Data in the Automobile
Insurance Industry, 58 J. Risk & Ins. 120 (1991); J. David Cummins & Stephen
Weisbart, The Impact of Consumer Services on Independent Insurance Agency
Performance (1977) (IMA Education and Research Foundation).
22

See Regan & Tennyson, supra note 20, at 638.
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publicly visible, as large insurers can more easily support a captive
distribution system and may also have greater advertising incentives.23
Second, other things being equal, coverage purchased through captive
agents will tend to be cheaper than coverage purchased through
independent agents.24 Because captive agents only work with one carrier,
they spend less time on each sale, meaning that they receive lower
commissions than independent agents.25 These lower commission rates
may result in lower premium rates for customers, as studies suggest that
insurers pass through to consumers most of the cost of agent
compensation.26
B. DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION OF INDEPENDENT AGENTS
Independent agents are compensated through standard commissions
on the premiums consumers pay for their coverage.27 These “ordinary”
commission rates have always varied based on the underlying line of
insurance sold, as different lines of insurance require different levels of
effort by insurance agents.28 But, historically, these commission rates were
relatively standard within specific insurance lines, as individual insurers
offered a single commission rate to all agents. Although new insurers

23

Id.

24

Itzhak Venezia et. al., Exclusive vs. Independent Agents: A Separating
Equilibrium Approach, 40 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 443, 444 (1999).
25

See Regan & Tennyson, supra note 20, at 648-49.

26

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 380-83. Competing factors, such as
the improved quality of an insurer’s underwriting criteria which is caused by
increased premiums, may offset this effect.
27

See id. at 374. In property/casualty insurance markets, these commissions
are generally the same each year that a consumer renews a policy, whereas
commission rates tend to decrease over time for life insurance sales personnel.
This creates its own conflicts of interest, which are beyond the scope of this
Article.
28

See id. at 374-75.
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occasionally offered above-market rates to break into markets, competition
ultimately ensured relatively uniform commissions within product lines.29
In the last few years, the premium commissions that different
insurers pay independent agents have begun to vary more significantly than
in the past. Some insurers now negotiate their commission rates on an
individual basis with agents, offering higher rates to agents that have
historically directed a large volume of profitable business to the insurer.30
As a result, many independent agents receive higher commission rates for
selling policies from one insurer than another, despite competitive forces.
Even insurance agents who receive the same premium commissions
from different insurers may nonetheless receive different contingent
commissions from those insurers.
Unlike differential premium
commissions, insurers have long paid contingent commissions to
independent agents.31 Contingent commissions are year-end bonuses that
some insurers pay to independent agents based on the performance of the
agent’s book of business with that insurer.32 Most contingent commission
contracts link this bonus to certain volume or profitability benchmarks for
the agent’s book of business. If the specified benchmarks are met, then the
insurer pays the agent a contingent commission that usually is calculated
based on the profitability and/or volume of the agent’s book of business
with that insurer.33 In life and health markets, agents often receive these
29

See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 301.

30

See, e.g., http://www.chubb.com/marketing/chubb7450.html; MetLife,
Supplemental Compensation Plan, http://www.whymetlife.com; Rupal Parekh,
Hartford the Latest to Offer Supplementals as Replacements for Contingent
Commissions, BUS. INS., 33 (July 2007).
31

See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 3056 (“Contingent commissions have been
used by insurers as an incentive mechanism for their agents for a century or
more.”).
32
33

Id.

In general, the size of an intermediary’s contingent commission is based on
two variables: (1) the amount of insurance business that a particular intermediary
refers to the insurer, as measured in total premiums; and (2) the profitability of that
business, which is usually measured by the insurer’s loss ratio on that business. In
most cases, intermediaries are only entitled to contingent commissions if they meet
threshold levels of both sales volume and profitability. See Jeffrey Wilder,
Competing for the Effort of a Common Agent: Contingency Fees in Commercial
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contingent commissions in the form of in-kind benefits, such as vacation
trips, rather than monetary compensation.34
However it is structured, differential compensation undermines
independent agents’ incentives to objectively present consumers with
information about competing insurance options.35 The reason is simple:
they incentivize independent insurance agents to steer consumers to carriers
based on considerations other than those customers’ insurance needs and
risk preferences. Most obviously, differential commissions encourage
insurance agents to steer consumers to insurers who pay the highest
commissions. But bec ause differential commissions are almost always tied
in some way to the volume and/or profitability of the agent’s book of
Insurance 5 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Econ. Analysis Group Working
Paper No. EAG03-4, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=418061. The loss
ratio is the “ratio between premiums paid and losses incurred during a given
period.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 958 (7th ed. 1999). Premiums on both new
policies and policy renewals are generally treated similarly in these calculations,
which are almost always made on a yearly basis. Wilder, supra, at 5. In some
cases, contingent commission arrangements may be based only on volume, not
profitability. However, “the great majority of the arrangements covering the
smaller intermediaries is based on the profitability of the business written or
profitability and volume.” Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 379. Once
intermediaries reach these qualifying levels, their commissions typically increase
with better results along either dimension. See Wilder, supra, at 5.
34

See, e.g., Broker Compensation, supra note 6, at 103-113 (testimony of F.
James Ginnane) (describing various cruises to the Baltics, Sweden, Montreal and
elsewhere that MassMutual paid based on annual production, and noting that “all
of the carriers” he was familiar with offer similar trips), available at
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/agbrok/br-cmp-tran-buf.pdf.
35

Consumers who purchase insurance via a captive agent have already made a
decision that they want to purchase their coverage with a particular carrier. This
means they will often have already priced out several different carriers and,
perhaps, asked neighbors or friends about their experiences with those carriers. By
contrast, consumers who seek out coverage via an independent agent have typically
not made any decisions about which carrier best suits their needs. Although they
may have had a particular agent recommended to them, they generally do not even
know which carriers the agent offers, much less the relative characteristics of those
carriers. Rather, independent agents offer themselves to consumers as an
alternative to comparison shopping among different insurers. They purport to do
the comparative shopping for the consumer.
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business with an insurer, they may also create more subtle steering
incentives for agents.36 For instance, they may lead agents to steer
customers to an insurer that has a minimum-volume requirement on the
cusp of being satisfied.37 Alternatively, they may cause an agent who
believes that a consumer is a “bad risk” to steer that consumer to an insurer
with whom the agent does not have a differential commission arrangement
tied to profitability.38 Differential commissions may also increase premium
costs for consumers.39
II.

THE DESIRABILITY OF A LEGAL RESPONSE TO
DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION FOR INDEPENDENT
AGENTS

Differential compensation of sales agents is common, and often
understood to be relatively benign in many industries and market contexts.
For instance, salespeople in retail stores may often receive special bonuses
or in-kind benefits if they reach sales targets for particular products or
brands. Like independent insurance agencies, such stores often carry
multiple brands and consumers may rely on the advice of salespeople in
making their decisions. Given that few suggest lawmakers regulate the
compensation of sales personnel in these contexts, why would a different
result be warranted in insurance markets?
Part of the answer is that consumer insurance markets are often
regulated in ways that would be unthinkable in other markets. For instance,
state insurance departments regulate product prices and designs and license
salespeople and insurers.40 Although the desirability of specific regulations
36

See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 297-301.

37

See Wilder, supra note 33, at 19.

38

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 386-89. For this reason, agents who
steer “high-risk” consumers to certain insurers may theoretically undermine their
client’s interest by signaling to the insurer that particular consumers are relatively
“high risk” and should thus be charged increased premiums. See Schwarcz,
Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 324-35.
39

See Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 383.

40

(1995).

See generally ETTLINGER ET AL., STATE INSURANCE REGULATION 103
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is often contentious, the notion that insurance requires robust market
conduct oversight is generally accepted. The reasons are two-fold. First,
consumer insurance markets are uniquely susceptible to market failure for a
variety of reasons, including the complexity of the underlying product, the
cognitive limitations of consumers, the prevalence of information
asymmetries, and various other external forces that distort the market by,
for instance, mandating the purchase of coverage.
Second, the
consequences of such market failure are significant. Consumers who have
inadequate coverage typically do not discover that fact until after they have
suffered a loss, at which point they no longer have the ability to mitigate
their damages.41
This Part applies these general rationales for insurance regulation to
differential compensation arrangements in consumer insurance markets. It
concludes the market forces that ordinarily limit the pernicious effects of
differential commissions are unreliable in consumer insurance contexts.
Similarly, it suggests that the consequences of the resulting market failure
are significant, contributing to a race to the bottom over claims-handling
practices in many consumer insurance lines.
A. DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION AND MARKET FAILURE
In ordinary product markets, an intermediary’s temptation to push
expensive or high-margin products is counter-balanced by the potential for
market backlash.42 At least some consumers are likely to arrive at a store
with some knowledge about competing product options, especially given
the wealth of such information available on the internet. This is
particularly true with big-ticket items – like high definition televisions or
cars – about which consumers will often invest time in researching.
Attempts to steer such consumers to inferior or overpriced products may
backfire, resulting in those consumers shopping elsewhere and sharing their

41

Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in
Order to Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 505, 583-84 (1998).
42

Howell Jackson, The Trilateral Dilemma in Financial Regulation, in
IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND SAVINGS
PROGRAMS (Lusardi, Annamaria ed., forthcoming 2009); Howell E. Jackson &
Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread
Premiums, 12 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289 (2007).
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negative impressions with friends and family.43 Although sales personnel
may attempt to target uninformed consumers, such an approach can be
risky as it may be hard to distinguish between informed and uninformed
consumers. And even consumers that do end up purchasing inferior or
over-priced products will often fail to discover this in the course of using
their product.44 Such consumers will not only hesitate before returning to
the store, but they too may talk to family and friends about their negative
experience.
To be sure, these market forces hardly eliminate sales contests and
inducements that lead to slanted advice – there will always remain sleezy
car salesmen, stores that sell over-priced and useless gadgets, and chains
that push consumers to purchase over-priced accessories that add little to
the overarching product. But the prospect that routine government
intervention in these contexts could efficiently improve matters is slim. As
this Section shows, these market forces that ordinarily protect consumers
from excessive steering work poorly in consumer insurance markets.
i.

Information in Consumer Insurance Markets

Unlike consumers in most markets, insurance consumers have
access to few, if any, accurate measures of an insurer’s reliability in paying
claims fairly and efficiently.45 It is, for instance, impossible for consumers
to find out how often individual insurers pay claims within 30, 60, 90, or
120 days of a claim being reported; how frequently they deny claims; how
frequently they are sued for payment or found guilty of bad faith; and how

43

For a general discussion of the role of reputation in disciplining sellers’
behavior, see Benjamin Klein & Keith Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981).
44

In economic parlance, insurance policies are thus “credence goods” because
most consumers cannot evaluate their quality even after they purchase the policy.
See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657,
720-21 (1985) (explaining the differences between search goods, experience goods,
and credence goods in economic and legal literature).
45

“Information about the reliability of different insurers is hard to come by
[and] the quality of insurance coverage is almost impossible to assess without an
expert.” KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 176 (1986).
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frequently policies are cancelled or non-renewed.46 While consumers can
look up how often complaints against specific insurers are lodged with state
regulators, this data is notoriously unreliable and inconsistent.47 Even the
data published by Consumer Reports is highly limited, as it does not take
into account the size and type of each consumer’s claim and it is based on
each consumer’s subjective experience with the claims process.48
Although consumers can, and do, carefully scrutinize premium
differentials from different carriers, the significance of price differentials is
almost impossible to assess without a corresponding understanding of the

46

One recent proposal to the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) would empower regulators to publicly disclose most of
these data elements about the relative quality of insurers’ claims handling, which
they already collect. See PROPOSAL FOR CENTRALIZED DATA COLLECTION,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS (Market Regulation
Committee Proposal). Unfortunately, insurers have bitterly resisted the proposal
under the guise of confidentiality and trade secrets. See Jim Connolly, NAIC
Insurer Conduct Data Scheme Riles Insurers, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Sept. 25,
2008,
available
at
http://www.propertyandcasualtyinsurancenews.
com/cms/nupc/Breaking%20News/2008/09/25-CONDUCTRULE-jc;
Chad
Hemenway, NCOIL Committee Votes Against NAIC Market Conduct Data
Proposal, BESTWIRE, Jul., 11 2008; Sean Carr, NAIC Sets September Vote for
Market Conduct Plan, BESTWIRE, Jul. 28, 2008; Letter from Am. Health Ins.
Plans, Am. Council of Life Insurers, Am. Ins. Ass’n, Blue Cross and Blue Shield
Ass’n, Nat’l Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos., and Prop. Cas. Insurers Ass’n of Am. to
Sandy Praeger, President of the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (May 27, 2008)
available
at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_d_data_collection_
comments_namic0527.pdf.
47

See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: The
American and British Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV.
735 (2009). Currently the Market Analysis and Priorities Working Group of the
NAIC is working to develop better codes for the entire complaint data collection
effort. See http://www.naic.org/committees_d_mapwg.htm (last visited February
8, 2009).
48

Consumer Reports surveys thousands of consumers who filed claims and
asks them to assess their satisfaction with the claims process. See Consumer
Reports Investigates, Surviving the Hard Market in Homeowners Insurance Vol.
69, Issue 9, Consumer Reports. 36 (Sept. 2004); Homeowners Insurance Report,
The New Protection Game Vol. 64, Issue 1, Consumer Reports, 16 (Jan. 1999).
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differences in the underlying products.49 A high-priced insurer may offer
good coverage for a fair price, while a low-priced insurer may offer
coverage that is poor, even relative to its seemingly low premiums. In fact,
it is precisely for these reasons that independent agents choose to market
themselves to consumers by focusing on their capacity to offer advice about
competing carriers.
This lack of concrete information about the relative quality of
different insurers undermines a key protection against aggressive steering
in ordinary consumer markets. As described above, the fact that consumers
ordinarily have the capacity to independently research and assess different
product options limits the capacity of ordinary retail establishments to steer
consumers to unfavorable deals. Moreover, it increases the prospect that
attempting to do so will create market backlash, leading consumers who
realize they are receiving poor advice to spread the word to others. But
because most consumers simply do not have concrete information with
which to assess the advice about the relative quality of carriers that
insurance agents dispense, these protections are less robust in consumer
insurance markets. This is particularly true given that insurance advice is
hardly formulaic. The best insurance options for a customer may depend
on numerous considerations, including the customer’s risk tolerance, cash
flow, preexisting relationships with carriers, and numerous other factors.
This means self-serving advice can often be justified on some basis, and
will rarely be obviously identifiable, even to experts.
Not only do consumers have a limited capacity to assess ex ante the
quality of different carriers’ coverage, but they also have a limited capacity
to do so ex post. Unlike almost any other product, only a very small
percentage of consumers end up using the insurance they purchase.50 When
they do, it is almost always for relatively small claims, even though the
most important element of that insurance is the coverage it provides in
cases of large losses.51 Finally, consumers that do submit claims to their
insurers are typically ill-equipped to judge the extent to which their insurer

49

Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 315.

50

See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial
Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1413-15 (2007).
51

See id. at 1415.
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lived up to its legal obligations.52 Consumers may therefore be susceptible
to insurers’ capacity to “tell a story” that appears to justify the refusal to
pay a claim or a relatively low settlement of that claim.53
This limitation in the capacity of consumers to assess insurance
quality ex post further limits the power of market forces to address the
steering that may result from differential compensation. Ordinarily,
consumers who are successfully directed to inferior or overpriced products
may discover this fact over time. Consumers who feel they were so
victimized can not only choose to shop elsewhere in the future, but can talk
to family and friends about their experience. Because most consumers who
are steered to inferior insurance will never realize this fact, they will not
exact these market penalties on agents who succumb to the temptation to
maximize their compensation by directing consumers to inferior
arrangements.
ii. Consumer Decision-Making about Insurance
In ordinary markets, consumers assess the desirability of different
product options using a roughly rational process, at least in the aggregate.
Especially when purchases involve big-ticket items, consumers are often
willing to invest a significant amount of cognitive energy into making sure
that they have thought through their options and selected a product that
meets their needs and desires. As a result, salespeople can often exert only
a minimal amount of pressure on shaping consumers’ preferences. When
salespeople push inferior or overpriced products, consumers may not only
resist such practices, but may choose to avoid the establishment in the
future and tell their friends and families of their experiences.
Two features of insurance markets substantially undermine this
reasoned purchasing behavior, and the disciplining impact it has on agents’
sales efforts. First, consumers typically purchase insurance as part of a
larger event or transaction, such as taking a job, moving, or buying a home
or automobile. Unlike with televisions, cars, or refrigerators, consumers do
not typically decide that they can finally afford a new insurance policy, or

52

See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories,
Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1407-13
(1994).
53

See id.
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that their old policy is out of style, obsolete, or run down.54 But the
bundled decision-making that typifies such insurance purchases is both
difficult and complicated, resulting in consumers “tend[ing] to adopt
simpler choice strategies to cope with that complexity.”55 Such simplistic
strategies obviously enhance the capacity of sales agents to steer consumer
decisions.
Second, empirical research has consistently demonstrated that
consumers’ preferences concerning insurance are remarkably malleable.56
Experimental research has established that framing effects can have
important implications for consumers’ purchases of insurance policies. For
instance, one study found that subjects were willing to pay more than twice
as much for flight insurance covering “terrorism” and “mechanical failure”
than they were willing to pay for flight insurance that would pay for losses
for “any reason.”57 Similarly, consumers tend to have bimodal responses to
low-probability, high-cost risks, either dismissing them entirely or
significantly overweighing their significance.58 Which of these outcomes
54

Evidence suggests that consumers rarely change carriers after they initially
purchase a policy, especially outside of the auto insurance context. INSURANCE
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC ATTITUDE MONITOR 2001, Issue 2, at 5, fig. 2-3
(reporting that only 7% of homeowners or renters changed insurers in the last five
years, but 23% of auto insurers did). When consumers do change insurers, they
overwhelmingly cite price as the reason. See id. at 6, fig. 2-4.
55

See Russel Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1223-34 (2003) (reviewing literature
displaying this consumer tendancy to choose simple choice strategies).
56

Consumers’ decision-making processes about insurance are a complicated
mix of intuitive, emotional, and rational responses that are susceptible to
manipulation. See Horward Kunruether & Mark Pauly, Insurance DecisionMaking and Market Behavior, 1 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS
63 (April 2005); David Cutler & Richard Zeckhauser, Extending the Theory to
Meet the Practice in Insurance, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services
(2004); PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 76-77 (2000).
57

Eric J. Johnson, et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance
Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 39 (1993).
58

Gary H. McClelland, et al., Insurance for Low Probability Hazards: A
Bimodal Response to Unlikely Events, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95, 104, 108-09
(1993).
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obtains often depends on the availability of the underlying risk. Thus,
Californians’ purchases of earthquake insurance generally increase
significantly immediately after an earthquake occurs and then gradually
decrease (until the next earthquake).59 Finally, consumers’ insurance
decisions are significantly impacted by their affection for the item to be
insured. In general, people prefer to insure against losses that involve high
affect, even when holding constant the expected value of the insurance and
the insured’s level of wealth.60 It is for precisely these reasons that insurers
are among the heaviest advertisers of any industry.61
Given this malleability of consumers’ insurance preferences,
experienced or well-trained sales agents are likely to have a substantial
capacity to steer consumers to insurers by helping to shape those
consumers’ preferences. This form of steering is unlikely to generate any
market backlash, because it involves altering consumers’ preferences.
Often, this manipulation unambiguously impedes efficient market outcomes
by skewing consumer assessments of objective information. This occurs,
for instance, with the framing of a risk to increase a consumer’s assessment
of its likelihood. At the same time, other types of manipulation may
admittedly operate on consumer insurance preferences in ways that are
normatively ambiguous.62 Consider an agent who focuses on a consumer’s
affection for an item in order to increase her desire to insure against loss to
that item. Evaluating the desirability of this result within a consequentialist

59

See Paul Slovic et al., Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small
Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS. 237, 249, 252, 254-55 (1977);
HOWARD KUNREUTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY
LESSONS 26-27, 36-41 (1978).
60

Christopher K. Hsee & Howard C. Kunreuther, The Affection Effect in
Insurance Decisions, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 142-43, 148 (2000). Entire
markets for insurance have flourished based on this principle: consider life
insurance for children, which in most cases is irrational based on standard
insurance theory.
61
62

See Baker, supra note 52, at 1404.

See Brett H. McDonnell, Endogenous Preferences and Welfare Evaluations,
5-6, 9-12 (Oct. 18, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=933089.
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framework is difficult (if not impossible), because there is no exogenouslydefined preference to serve as a benchmark for that evaluation.63
iii. Insurance
Agents’
Discrimination
Between
Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Purchasers
In any consumer market, plenty of consumers will be relatively
uninformed and therefore susceptible to inefficient steering. But these
uninformed consumers are typically protected by their more informed
counterparts. Because aggressive or misleading sales efforts that are
directed at informed and engaged consumers can have negative effects on a
business’s reputation, uninformed or rationally ignorant consumers often
benefit from the presence of their more informed counterparts when sales
people cannot distinguish between the two.64
Once again, though, this market protection against inefficient
steering is less robust in insurance markets. Unlike most salespeople,
insurance agents must discuss clients’ personal situations in order to assess
their coverage needs and facilitate insurer underwriting.65 This process
enhances agents’ capacity to assess the relative sophistication of their
consumers, and to offer advice accordingly. In fact, one of the earliest
studies of contingent commission payments found just such a pattern of
discrimination in a large independent insurance agency in Arizona:
relatively engaged customers were less frequently directed to insurers that
paid contingent commissions than customers who were less engaged with
their insurance purchases.66 Such consumer segmentation undermines one
63

See id. at 12, 18.

64

Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630,
636-38 (1979).
65
66

Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 318.

Id. at 317-18; see Wilder, supra note 33, at 2-3, 5, 7. The agency, which
remained unidentified, employed eight agents with no ownership stake in the
company and three “equity agents” who received a portion of the agency’s profits.
Because the contingent commissions that the company received were paid directly
to the company, the three equity agents stood to gain more from maximizing
contingent commissions than the non-equity agents. Additionally, only the equity
agents handled “house” accounts, which (1) either originated in another agency that
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of the core protections against undue steering in ordinary markets: the
capacity of an informed minority to protect the interests of other
consumers.67
B. THE COST OF MARKET FAILURE FOR DIFFERENTIAL
COMMISSIONS
Market failures, of course, are ubiquitous. And many of these
market failures are better left alone than subjected to the expensive, and
often ineffective (or worse), forces of government regulation. But that is
not the case here. This Section argues that insurers’ payments of
differential compensation to independent agents facilitate a “race to the
bottom” in consumer insurance markets through insurer-side adverse
selection.68 They do so by undermining the willingness of independent
agents to inform consumers about insurers’ claims handling practices or to
counteract consumers’ tendency to discount the value of quality claims
handling.

the company subsequently acquired or were originally handled by an agent who
retired, and (2) did not fit the portfolio or expertise of any non-equity agent. The
defining characteristics of these house accounts strongly suggest that they were less
sensitive than other agency customers to the level of service they received from
their agent. This hypothesis was corroborated by the fact that house accounts were
three times more likely than other accounts to pay their premiums directly to their
insurer, rather than to pay them through the agency, indicating disengagement with
their insurance agent. The study concluded contingent commissions significantly
impacted the recommendations that the equity agents gave to their less responsive
consumers, finding that “the prospect of contingency fees [led] equity agents to
increase the frequency with which they place house accounts with insurers offering
contingent commissions by more than 50%.” Id.
67

See Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 1406-08; R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck,
Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to Correct for
Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L. J. 635, 672, 674-75 (1996).
68

BAKER, supra note 9, at 7. Just as insurer’s lack of information about
consumers can lead to adverse selection, consumers’ lack of information about
insurers can lead to the “insurer-side” adverse selection described above.
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Insurer-side Adverse Selection

Part A described how insurance consumers’ limited information on
the relative quality of different insurance options and suspect decisionmaking about insurance can lead ostensibly independent agents to steer
consumers to inferior insurers. But these two market conditions can also
have the more general impact of undermining competition among insurers
with respect to claims handling.
If a sufficiently large percentage of consumers are ill-informed
about insurers’ claims handling, insurers that pursue aggressive claims
handling strategies (lemons) will profit more than other insurers. These
insurers can pass on some of these profits to consumers in the form of
lower premiums. In the long run, this will force other insurers to either
drop out of consumer markets or, more likely, adopt low quality claims
handling practices themselves.69 By contrast, if a sizable number of
consumers are cognizant of differences in insurers’ claims handling, then
some insurers will seek to appeal to these consumers by adopting a high
price, high quality brand. That, in turn, could force other market players to
compete over their own claims handling quality. Of course, insurers’
quality/price mix would still vary, with different insurers appealing to
consumers with different risk preferences. As a result, the market as a
whole would compete along both of the two primary dimensions that define
the insurance-policyholder relationship.
Through similar mechanisms, insurer-side adverse selection can
occur if insurance consumers’ decision-making causes them to under-value,
or under-appreciate, differences in insurers’ claims handling practices.
There are strong reasons to suspect consumer decision-making about
insurance generally has this character.70 The relative value to consumers of
high quality insurance depends on two considerations: (i) the likelihood
they will suffer a potentially insurable loss, and (ii) the likelihood a lowquality insurer will poorly handle any such claim relative to a high-quality
insurer. With respect to the former, research has consistently found that
most people judge their own likelihood of suffering a loss to be lower than
69

See generally Hanson & Kysar, supra note 14, at 630, 722, 724-25, 746-47
(exploring how consumers’ under-estimation of risks can compel a similar race to
the bottom with respect to those risks).
70

Indeed, research has consistently found that there is a “systematic tendency
for insurance in practice to differ from insurance in theory.” Cutler & Zeckhauser,
supra note 56, at 3.
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the average such risk, so long as they retain even a minimal amount of
control over the event.71 Thus, people in general are overly optimistic
about their risk of being injured in an earthquake,72 being involved in a car
accident,73 suffering health problems,74 and dying young.75 For these
reasons, they also generally buy less insurance against these risks than they
should, especially when no outside force – such as legal mandates or loan
terms – artificially increases demand.76
Although less evidence exists as to how consumers evaluate the
likelihood that a low-quality insurer will poorly handle a claim relative to a
high-quality insurer, there are theoretical reasons to believe people will also
tend to under-estimate this risk differential. In part, that is because
consumers’ choice of insurers involves precisely the minimal amount of
control over an ultimate risk (the risk of a low-quality choice having
negative consequences) that leads people in other contexts to believe their
71

A separate relevant strand of research has found that, when facing lowprobability risks, people tend to either dismiss those risks entirely or overweigh the
value of insurance against those risks. See SLOVIC, supra note 56, at 75, 77;
McClelland, supra note 58, at 95, 108-109. This conclusion, however, has
ambiguous implications for the extent to which consumers believe they will suffer
an insurable loss, depending on the side of the bimodal distribution on which an
insured risk falls.
72

Jerry M. Burger & Michele L. Palmer, Changes in and Generalization of
Unrealistic Optimism Following Experiences with Stressful Events: Reactions to
the 1989 California Earthquake, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 39, 401 (1992).
73

David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self Evaluation: The Role of
Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 324 (Thomas Gilovich et al., eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2002); KUNREUTHER, supra note 59, at 240.
74

Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 807 (1980).
75

See Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should
Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 2, 4, 23 (2001-2002).
76

See id. (noting the vast majority of Americans are under-insured against the
risk of dying young); KUNREUTHER, supra note 59 (suggesting most Californians
do not purchase earthquake insurance).
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risk is lower than the average such risk.77 Additionally, however, the actual
difference between low and high quality insurers is ambiguous, in that it
involves numerous considerations that are hard to definitively compare
across insurers, even with all relevant information.78 Research suggests
people tend to interpret such ambiguous information in self-serving ways.79
Given that high quality insurance unambiguously costs more than low
quality insurance, this bias may theoretically manifest itself in consumers
dismissing potential differences in claims handling quality.
Of course, the mere fact that economic conditions in insurance
markets could theoretically lead to insurer-side adverse selection does not
make it so. But many consumer insurance markets do appear to be
characterized by some degree of insurer-side adverse selection, with few
insurers pursuing high-quality, high-price strategies. Aside from the
common (though often anecdotal) observations of commentators
acknowledging this equilibrium,80 significant evidence suggests prominent
national insurers such as Unum/Provident, State Farm, and Allstate have
each recently engaged in systematic, national efforts to cut claims payments

77

See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.

78

See supra text accompanying notes 45-53.

79

Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse:
The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 111 (1997).
80

See, e.g., Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 217 F.3d 1291, 1296
(10th Cir. 2000) (observing Blue Cross had "a financial interest in denying claims
in order to remain economically viable as well as competitive within the insurance
industry"); BAKER, supra note 9, at 128 (collecting specific examples of seeming
insurer opportunism); Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 1401-26; John Langbein, Trust
Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of
Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. L. REV. 1315, 1331 (2007) (“Even when
insurance is experience rated, the insurer still has an incentive to deny claims,
because the market for insurance services is intensely competitive. Low-cost
providers prevail over high-cost providers.”). But see Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith”
Breach of Contract by First Party Insurers, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 405, 418 (1996)
(arguing that “any insurer who frequently refused to pay covered claims would
likely soon develop a reputation for behaving in this fashion and lose customers,”
but acknowledging that “it is plausible that insurers might occasionally behave
opportunistically without suffering a prohibitive reputational penalty”).
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to policyholders.81 Additionally, the insurance industry plays a significant
role in limiting public access to information about different insurers’ claims
handling quality. For instance, insurers have collectively devoted immense
energy and resources to ensuring that data about their claims handling
quality, which is already collected by state insurance regulators, is not
made publicly available.82 Similarly, studies of insurer marketing and
advertising suggest that individual insurers do not publicly advertise any
concrete information about the quality of their claims handling, preferring
instead vague and unverifiable promises about trust (as well as concrete
promises about price, of course).83 In a market where insurers sought to
compete over the quality of their claims-handling, one would expect that
some insurers would prominently resist these trends.
ii. The Role of Differential Compensation in Explaining
Insurers’ Race to the Bottom
As described above, the two economic conditions that make insurer
side adverse selection a plausible, and seemingly accurate, description of
consumer insurance markets are (i) consumer ignorance about claims
handling quality and (ii) under-appreciation of the significance of this
variable.
This Section suggests that differential compensation of
independent insurance intermediaries is a key contributor to this
equilibrium.
Consumer markets are ordinarily able to overcome informational
problems through the evolution of a network of independent intermediaries
that digest complicated data and objectively present consumers with
advice.84 This process allows consumers to make informed choices that
81

See JEFFREY STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD: THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V. STATE
FARM (2008) (displaying State Farm’s practices); Langbein, supra note 80, at 1318-21
(displaying Unum/Provident’s practices); Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Advocates
Call for Refunds, Rate Reductions, For Allstate Policyholders After Company Releases
Internal Documents Revealing Intentionally Underpaid Customers, REUTERS, Apr. 7,
2008 (displaying Allstate’s practices), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
pressRelease/idUS187467+ 07-Apr-2008+PRN20080407.
82

See documents cited supra note 46.

83

See generally Baker, supra note 52.

84

See Thomas F. Cotter, Some Observations on the Law and Economics of
Middlemen, 1 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 69-70 (2006) (describing several economic
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reflect their risk preferences despite their relative lack of understanding
about the underlying market. Just as importantly, it improves the decisionmaking of less sophisticated consumers, by influencing insurers’
reputations through word-of-mouth among consumers.85
In the insurance context, objective and independent market
intermediaries could accomplish these ends by digesting data on claims
handling quality, along with repeated first-hand observation of insurers’
practices, to accurately communicate information about insurers’ claims
handling practices. Such information gathering services are particularly
significant in consumer insurance markets, not simply because of the dearth
of public information on insurers’ claims handling practices,86 but also
because few consumers could independently assess such information, even
if it were publicly available. The quality of an insurer’s claims handling is
not a monolithic concept, and could be constructed in multiple ways, with
differences in metrics appearing significant when they were not, or vice
versa. For instance, data suggesting an insurer denied a relatively high
percentage of claims, or a relatively high number of its consumers sue for
coverage or complain to state regulators, might simply reflect the insurer’s
pool of policyholders, rather than its claims handling practices.87

roles for middlemen, including assisting “consumers by reducing the cost of
product search and evaluation, helping consumers to find the products that best fit
their needs, and helping consumers to manage risk.”).
85

This role of market intermediaries in filtering and processing information for
less sophisticated parties has been extensively discussed in debates on the efficient
capital markets hypothesis, which is often imagined to achieve efficiency through a
similar market intermediation mechanism. See generally Susanna Kim Ripken,
Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings in
Corporate Forward Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 929 (2005)
(discussing the role of market intermediaries in the efficient capital markets
hypothesis).
86
87

See supra Part II.A.

Insurers have themselves seized on these difficulties in assessing claims
handling data as one of their primary arguments against public disclosure. See
Letter from Wiley Rein to Sandy Praeger, Pres. of the Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs
6 (April 16,2008), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees
_d_data_collection_comments_namic0416.pdf (resisting the public release of
market conduct regulation, because “release of the information in raw form without
the benefit of evaluation and interpretation would be unfair and potentially
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Just as independent and objective sales agents can improve
consumer information, they can also improve consumers’ capacity to
rationally and thoughtfully assess the trade-offs associated with purchasing
relatively high quality insurance. By employing “debiasing” strategies,
intermediaries may be able to counteract the tendency of consumers to
under-appreciate the value of high quality coverage.88 For instance,
research suggests that people who are convinced that a potential loss is
truly random generally no longer perceive they are relatively less likely
than average to suffer from those losses.89 By pointing out just how little
control people have over the financial losses that are the subject of
insurance, independent intermediaries could convince consumers to pay
more for more reliable coverage. Similarly, independent agents might be
able to concretize information about insurers’ relative claims handling,
thereby limiting the ambiguity of risk differentials that can trigger a selfserving interpretation of information. Even if independent intermediaries
could not neutralize these biases, they might be able to counteract them.90
For instance, independent agents could attempt to enhance consumers’
evaluations of the risks attendant to low quality coverage by vividly
describing these risks. Increasing the availability of risks can counteract
consumers’ tendency to underestimate them.91
Differential compensation undermines these market intermediation
mechanisms by distorting the objectivity of the advice independent
damaging to insurers, and misleading to policyholders, investors, and the public at
large.”).
88

See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 199, 204-05 (2006).
89

Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An
Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306, 307 (1999); David Dunning,
Chip Heath & Jerry M. Suls, Flawed Self-Assessments: Implications for Health,
Education, and the Workplace, 5 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INTEREST 69, 80 (2004) (“One
of the strongest moderators of unrealistic optimism is perceived control. The
greater a person’s perceived control over an event or its outcome, the stronger the
person’s optimistic bias.”).
90

See Johnson et al., supra note 57, at 48. (“[C]onsumers’ decisions about
insurance can be affected by distortions in their perceptions of risk and by
alternative framing of premium and benefits.”).
91

Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 88.
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insurance agents offer to consumers.92 Agents’ capacity to mitigate
consumer ignorance about insurance and debias consumers in ways that
promote thoughtful consideration of insurance quality depends on agents
prioritizing the interests of those clients. When intermediaries are
incentivized to steer consumers to insurers in order to maximize their
compensation, they are also encouraged to manipulate consumer
preferences and impressions to achieve this outcome. This short-circuits
the ordinary market solutions to informational and decision making
problems in complex consumer markets. As a result, even insurers that are
interested in cultivating a high-price, high-quality market strategy have
limited vehicles for effectively communicating this strategy to potentially
interested consumers. This creates circumstances under which insurer-side
adverse selection with respect to claims handling can (and seemingly does)
flourish.
III.

CRAFTING AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO DIFFERENTIAL
COMPENSATION

Given the need for reform described in Part II, this Part briefly
concludes by considering a simple legal intervention in insurance markets
that resembles measures adopted in the federally-regulated markets that
relate to Medicare.93 That reform would limit insurer compensation of
independent agents selling consumer lines of coverage to premium-based
commissions, and would require insurers to pay a single, flat commission
rate to all independent agents in their distribution networks. It would not
mandate any particular commission rate, allowing insurers to choose the
rate they wanted to offer to their independent agents. Insurers could set
different premium commission rates for different lines of insurance,
reflecting the fact that different product lines require different levels of
effort for agents. Additionally, insurers could pay different commission
rates to independent agents in different states to account for premium and
cost of living differences across states.
Such reform would largely eliminate the distorting potential of
differential compensation, leaving independent intermediaries without
significant financial reasons to promote the policies of one insurer over
another. Although some insurers might offer slightly higher commission
rates than others, competition would ensure that these differentials would
92

See Section II.A, supra.

93

See Press Release, supra note 15.

2009]

DIFFERENTIAL COMPENSATION

749

generally be quite small.94 To the extent that differentials in commission
rates persisted, they would be much less problematic than current
commission differentials. Rather than rewarding individual preferred
agents who steered consumers to a particular insurer, they would reflect an
insurer’s decision to offer above market commissions to all independent
agents who sell a particular product line. As noted earlier, such a strategy
might be justifiable for new entrants in a market seeking to establish a
customer base.95 Moreover, a high commission strategy might also be
sensible for insurers offering high-price, high-quality products if the sale of
such products requires comparatively more effort. Indeed, some economics
literature suggests that sales agents in the consumer electronics industry
may receive higher commission rates, on a per-dollar basis, for the sale of
high quality products than low quality products for this reason.96
Not only would a flat compensation rate for an insurer’s
independent agents help to solve the problems identified in Part II, but it
would do so while imposing few administrative costs. A ban on contingent
commissions or other specific compensation arrangements, standing alone,
only invites insurers to design compensation structures that retain the same
basic incentivizing function, but technically comply with the ban. Insurers’
switch from contingent commissions to “supplemental compensation”
arrangements, which retain the same performance-based contingency
structure, is illustrative.97 Because of its simplicity, a mandatory flat rate of
94

Tacit collusion among insurers in setting commission rates would be
unlikely, given the number of insurers who rely on independent agents to distribute
their products.
95

See supra text accompanying note 29 (noting that this was one reason
historically that insurers offered higher premium commission rates).
96

See Ajay Kalra, Mengze Shi, Kannan Srinivasan, Salesforce Compensation
Scheme and Consumer Inference, 655 Management Science (2003).
97

See Sally Roberts, Compensation Shake-Up Continues; Chubb Pays $17M,
Ends All Contingents, BUS. INS., Dec. 25, 2006 (noting that the Chubb agreement
states that “a fixed commission paid to a producer, set prior to the sale of a
particular insurance product, and that may be based on, among other things, the
prior year’s performance of the producer’ is not considered contingent”).
Although some have suggested that these newly-emerging arrangements avoid the
conflicts of interest associated with contingent commissions because they are
“retrospective rather than prospective,” this argument is unpersuasive. The fact
that supplemental compensation arrangements are retrospective merely shifts
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compensation for all intermediaries avoids this inefficient gaming.
Moreover, it would be easy to enforce because it would operate on insurers
rather than intermediaries. There are obviously fewer insurers than
intermediaries (making market conduct observation easier) and insurers are
less likely to engage in outright fraud than individual intermediaries who
have less to lose from doing so.
Of course, mandating that insurers pay their independent agents a
single commission rate is significantly more intrusive than a disclosurebased response to the problem. Not only would it be more costly to employ
than disclosure, but it might distort consumer insurance markets in ways
that may be hard to measure, or even predict. Nonetheless, such an
aggressive intervention is prudent.
First, merely enhancing the disclosure requirements of independent
agents is unlikely to mitigate the risk of steering, and the attendant risks of
insurer-side adverse selection. Although I develop the limits of a
disclosure-based regulatory response elsewhere,98 the basic argument is
simple: as described above, the reason that market forces do not prevent
inefficient steering is that consumers generally have a limited ability to
independently assess their insurance options. Merely informing consumers
that their intermediaries may have a conflict of interest does nothing to
address this fact. Of course, such disclosure could facilitate an agent’s
capacity to eschew differential compensation as a marketing technique.99
But such efforts would be unlikely to prove profitable because consumers
would have little sense of the value of such neutrality.
It is for precisely these reasons that compensation practices in
consumer insurance markets have not, in fact, changed since 2004, despite
the very public revelation of agents’ conflicts of interest at that time and the
adoption of mandatory disclosure laws in a number of states since.100 This
is particularly noteworthy given that numerous intermediaries in
commercial insurance markets have voluntarily disclaimed differential

forward the potential pay-off to intermediaries of steering customers to sub-optimal
insurance. See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 292.
98

Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1.

99

As noted above, this is precisely what has happened in commercial
insurance markets.
100

See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 3064; Cooper, supra note 8, at 100.
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compensation to recruit and retain new clients.101 Simply put, if potential
clients are not attuned to the importance of unbiased advice or the ways in
which advice can be distorted by incentive structures, they will not be
swayed to change their behavior by competitors’ promises of neutrality.
In fact, regulations of structurally similar conflicts of interest in
other industries have often gone beyond disclosure-based strategies for
precisely these reasons.
Differential compensation of insurance
intermediaries is one form of a common type of regulatory problem, coined
a “trilateral dilemma.”102 In a trilateral dilemma, an end-service provider
compensates a market intermediary in order to induce the intermediary to
steer consumers’ business to the end-service provider.103 Regulations of
such side payments often do more than merely require disclosure, for the
precise reasons developed above. Examples include prohibitions against
certain side payments to real estate settlement providers,104 limitations on
side payments that brokerage firms can pay to investment managers,105 and
limitations on attorneys’ receipts of side-payments for referrals to other
attorneys.106
Second, none of the proposed economic rationales for differential
compensation appreciably enhance the efficiency of consumer insurance
markets.107 The most significant such potential benefit of differential
101

See supra text accompanying note 3.

102

See Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 312-19; Jackson, supra
note 42.
103

Jackson, supra note 42..

104

See 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (2006).

105

See D. Bruce Johnsen, Property Rights to Investment Research: The Agency
Costs to Soft Dollar Brokerage, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 75, 82-83 (1994); see also 15
U.S.C. § 78b (2008).
106
107

See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.2(b) (2009).

Aside from the enhanced underwriting theory addressed in the text,
contingent commissions have also been defended because they: (i) may expand
coverage for non-verifiable losses, Neil A. Doherty & Alexander Muermann,
Insuring the Uninsurable: Brokers and Incomplete Insurance Contracts 18 (Ctr. for
Fin. Studies, Working Paper Nov. 24, 2005) available at http://www.ifkcfs.de/papers/05 24.pdf.; (ii) protect small agencies, Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at
3042; and (iii) facilitate economies of scale by encouraging intermediaries to work
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compensation is that it can improve the “front-line underwriting” of
independent agents by giving them a stake in insurers’ profitability.108
According to this theory, agents often possess information about the
riskiness of customers that insurers cannot directly observe, as they interact
directly with their customers and may have long standing relationships with
them. Differential compensation that is linked to insurer profitability gives
agents an economic reason to convey truthful information to the insurer.
Alternatively, such compensation may facilitate improved underwriting
simply by causing an agent who believes that a consumer is a “bad risk” to
steer that consumer to a different insurer that does not pay differential
commissions.
Whatever purchase this theory may have in commercial insurance
markets, it is simply implausible in the context of consumer insurance lines.
The theory assumes agents do indeed have important underwriting
information about their clients that insurers cannot observe directly. But
insurer underwriting in consumer insurance markets is generally
standardized and based on simple and easily administrable algorithms.109
Even if independent agents did possess information that could not be
captured in an insurance application, it is unlikely that insurers would find

with fewer insurers, Cummins & Doherty, supra, note 4, at 386-89. For reasons
developed in Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure, supra note 1, at 305-11, these
justifications are not persuasive. A final defense of contingent commissions – that
they help small insurers to break into the market – is not in conflict with the
proposal suggested herein, which would permit insurers to offer above-market
premium commission rates.
108

Cummins & Doherty, supra note 4, at 386-89; see also Regan & Tennyson,
supra note 20, at 639 (“The agent is the first contact the insurer has with a potential
policyholder and may be able to obtain information about the customer which
would be difficult or costly for the firm to verify. It is widely acknowledged that
agents often employ subjective criteria in evaluating insurance applicants.”).
109

See ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, supra note 45, at 78 (“[A]n efficient
classification system does not strive to make its premiums equal expected costs
beyond the point where that goal is worth achieving.”). RICHARD V. ERICKSON,
AARON DOYLE & DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 241 (2003)
(“Individual companies are increasingly less likely to undertake their own home
inspection or direct field investigations of an applicant. Instead, more risk
assessment is centralizing into data system operated by information service
companies that supply the insurance industry.”).
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incorporating that information into their underwriting to be cost efficient.110
This is especially true given the lack of adverse selection in most consumer
insurance markets.111
Of course insurance markets, like all markets, change over time.
Thus, rationales for differential compensation that may not be compelling
now may prove significant later. Consequently, any market intervention
should be accompanied with continued monitoring and supervision. But
the need for continuous re-assessment does not absolve lawmakers from
ignoring conflicts of interest in consumer insurance markets that have been
addressed in commercial and federally-regulated insurance markets. The
failure of state lawmakers to act not only undermines the efficiency of
consumer insurance markets, but it blunts the claim that consumer
protection is best secured through the continuation of state-based insurance
regulation.112

110

See H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 135 (1970) (explaining how insurers must
adopt easily administrable rules of thumb to operate effectively).
111

See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An
Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1224-5 (2004).
112

See, e.g., Press Release, NAIC Still in Opposition to Federal Regulation
(Jan. 20, 2009) (On file with the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners).
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